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The Demographics of Fund Turnover 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This article documents various demographic factors which influence mutual fund turnover 
including managerial experience, location, education, and gender. On average, funds in 
financial centers trade more but this excess turnover declines with experience. While most extra 
trading is concentrated among less experienced managers in financial centers, they do not 
outperform inexperienced managers located in smaller towns. Furthermore, managers in 
financial centers increase trading after good performance. This result is particularly strong for 
inexperienced, more educated male fund managers investing in growth stocks and located in 
New York. Our results provide strong evidence that demographic factors influence fund 
manager trading behavior. 
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1. Introduction 
Several studies link mutual fund trading to returns. For example, Edelen (1999) 
estimates that excess trading caused by liquidity can significantly reduce performance, and 
Edelen, Evans, and Kadlec (2008) try to back out the cost of trading on portfolio returns from 
holdings data. Other papers such as Wermers (2000), Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005, 
2008), Kacperczyk and Seru (2007) consider how changes in holdings of portfolio managers 
can be used to predict future returns of mutual funds and evaluate the informativeness of fund 
trades. However, little research is focused on identifying those factors that influence turnover in 
mutual funds. Christoffersen, Musto, and Keim (2008) consider the fund-specific 
characteristics which explain trading costs but do not consider cross-sectional explanations for 
differences in trading levels across mutual funds. Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2005) show that 
mutual fund trades within cities are correlated, but they do not compare overall turnover levels 
across cities.  
 In contrast to previous literature, our study provides novel evidence linking 
demographic determinants to fund trading. We observe that turnover is much higher among 
fund managers in financially prominent cities, and relate this higher level of trading to 
overconfident behavior. Our subsequent analysis explores whether managers’ education, 
location, experience, and gender contribute to their assessment of their own abilities and affect 
how they react to information and trade.  
Overconfidence among investors is likely to be pervasive in locations where 
professional traders have some reason to believe that they are more skillful and/or have access 
to private or more precise information. Higher average wages, education level, and productivity 
in larger and more densely populated cities, especially among professionals dealing with 
imprecise tasks, may all contribute to their feeling of being more knowledgeable than their 
peers from smaller towns.1  Heath and Tversky (1991) develop the concept of competence, in 
                                                 
1 For instance, Glaeser (1999) finds that workers in New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles are 10% more likely to 
be college graduates than in other U.S. cities. Wheeler (2001) shows that increase in the size of a city increases the 
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which people are willing to bet on their own judgments about ambiguous outcomes when they 
feel knowledgeable about them. In this respect, portfolio managers who believe they are 
smarter in making investment decisions will act more aggressively on their judgments, which 
may often be incorrect. The potential existence of rich information sources in financial centers 
can make investors in those places think that their signals can be traded on, although this is not 
always the case. Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subramanyam (1998, 2001) note that investors are 
overconfident about their private information, rather than general public information.  
 Our data includes all diversified domestic equity mutual funds in the U.S. that existed 
between 1992 and 2002, i.e., funds that hold information-sensitive securities. The equity funds 
belong to four investment objectives: aggressive growth, growth and income, income, and large 
growth. 
Funds in financial centers trade more and perform better than other funds on average. 
The difference in turnover is 6% per year while the difference in abnormal returns (adjusted for 
fund size and investment objective) is 0.6% per year and both are statistically significant. One 
explanation for higher levels of turnover in financial centers is the availability of more 
information, while the alternative is related to overconfidence bias. This paper distinguishes 
between these two explanations by relying on the predictions of Gervais and Odean (2001) and 
Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) models of overconfidence. Accordingly, if 
overconfident trading is more prevalent in financial centers, excessive trading should decrease 
over time as managers realize their true ability. In addition, an overconfident manager is likely 
to trade more aggressively after performing well since they attribute too much of their success 
to their own investing skills.  
Both predictions of overconfident trading in financial centers are borne out in the data. 
First, excess turnover is significantly higher for young managers in financial centers than 
elsewhere (almost 11% higher), but the difference across locations is negligible when we 
                                                                                                                                                           
wage return to education and proportion of college graduates. Ciccone and Hall (1996) compute that doubling of 
employment density increases productivity by six percent. 
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compare managers with more than five years of experience. Second, managers in financial 
centers trade more aggressively after good performance, especially less experienced managers. 
This relation is particularly strong for funds investing in hard-to-value growth-oriented stocks 
and those that are located in New York and is present even after controlling for other fund 
characteristics such as size, age, expense ratio, and volatility. In spite of more aggressive 
trading in financial centers, we do not find that the extra turnover improves future returns. We 
therefore conclude that trading in financial centers is excessive, especially since many other 
studies have documented that higher turnover hurts current performance. 2 As further evidence 
of overconfidence, we also find that aggressive trading is more prevalent among male fund 
managers, consistent with Barber and Odean (2001). Finally, managers with better education 
(proxied by manager-specific SAT scores) trade less overall but are more likely to trade 
aggressively after experiencing good past performance.  
Our results suggest that managers in financial centers exhibit more overconfident 
trading behavior which diminishes over time.3 The existence of a positive relation between 
prior fund performance and current turnover, as well as the reduction in turnover over time 
support the models of Gervais and Odean (2001) and Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam 
(1998). Therefore, we show that various demographic factors influence fund managers’ 
assessment of their investing ability, and, as a result, affect their trading behavior and 
performance. 
                                                 
2 The negative relation between overconfidence and average performance is well documented in the literature. For 
example, Odean (1998) and Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subramanyam (1998) argue that investor overconfidence leads 
to more frequent trading which may not offset on average the costs of trading. Odean (1999) and Barber and 
Odean (2000, 2001) document that more frequent trading results in underperformance for individual investors. See 
Hirshleifer’s (2001) for an excellent review of the literature. Note however, that if overconfident investors have 
access to private signals, their profits can exceed those of fully rational investors. For example, Kyle and Wang 
(1997) and Hirshleifer and Luo (2001) show that by trading more aggressively on accurate (private) information, 
overconfident traders are likely to outperform those who trade less frequently. 
3 For the remainder of the paper, we maintain a very generic definition of overconfidence. It may results from (i) 
the overestimation of the precision of information about the value of a financial security, (ii) the better-than-
average effect (i.e., if investors think that they have superior skills), or (iii) the illusion-of-control effect (when 
investors bias upward their estimates of own success probability). Glaser and Weber (2007) argue, for example, 
that only better-than-average effect leads to more frequent trading. 
 5
This study is most closely related to Christoffersen and Sarkissian (2009), but discusses 
different economic questions. Christoffersen and Sarkissian (2009) focus on fund returns and 
find that mutual funds located in financial centers tend to outperform funds located in other 
places over time. The main explanation behind their results is better learning opportunities in 
large cities. The current study investigates the differences in the trading behavior of funds 
across geographic locations and such managerial characteristics as experience, education, and 
gender. The main hypothesis which motivates this study is that fund managers in larger centers 
are more likely to believe they have more precise information and better ability because they 
are located in places with greater supply of private information and skilled managers. The 
overestimation of information precision and ability results in overconfident behavior in 
financial centers across managers with different experience and education levels, and between 
genders. Consistent with theoretical models, we observe that detrimental overconfident trading 
disappears with experience. While performance gains among fund managers in financial 
centers relates to improved investing skills over time, as shown in Christoffersen and Sarkissian 
(2009), some early improvements may also come from learning to be less overconfident. To 
make our findings compatible with those in Christoffersen and Sarkissian (2009), we use the 
same data set. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates our study discussing 
two types of learning experiences in financial centers. Section 3 describes the data while 
Section 4 discusses the impact of demographic variables on fund turnover. Section 5 documents 
the differences in turnover and performance across various fund and manager characteristics 
depending on location as well as examines the relation between prior fund performance and 
current trading activity. It provides the first evidence of overconfident trading in financial 
centers. Section 6 is devoted to the analysis of the relation between past fund turnover and 
current performance. In this section, to control for manager job changes, we perform our 
analysis using manager tenure instead of using the total time spent by a manager in a given city. 
Section 7 presents an alternative hypothesis for our main results. Finally, Section 8 concludes. 
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2. Motivation 
While numerous papers have been written about cross-sectional and time-series 
variations in mutual fund returns, there are none that we are aware of that explain differences in 
turnover across funds. This paper provides a unique look at determinants of mutual fund 
turnover by focusing on demographic differences across managers, such as managerial 
experience, location, education, and gender. Christoffersen and Sarkissian (2009) report that 
turnover of funds in financial centers is higher than in smaller cities. This extra trading activity 
may be due to better access to information in large cities. It may also reflect overconfident 
trading among fund managers. Fund managers in financial centers are at a higher risk of being 
more overconfident than their peers in smaller cities for two reasons. First, large cities are 
associated with more information generation and dissemination, so it is likely that fund 
managers in these locations trade more aggressively by believing that their information is 
private and not yet priced by the market. Second, large cities have a better educated pool of 
people (see SAT scores Table 1) who earn on average higher wages. Overconfidence among 
fund managers is likely to be more pervasive in locations when they have a good reason to 
believe that they are more educated or skillful. In this study, we test whether overconfidence is 
more prevalent in financial centers using the predictions of the Gervais and Odean (2001) and 
Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) models. There are several hypotheses of 
overconfident trading that we test.  
 
H1: Overconfident trading declines with manager experience in the long run. 
 
Traders who suffer from behavioral biases will initially overestimate the precision of 
their information and their ability. As a result, they react too aggressively on information and 
trade excessively. However, over time, traders realize their ability and the precision of their 
information, so we expect excess trading to predominate among inexperienced managers. In 
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contrast, if trading is purely informative and fund managers learn from their trades, we would 
expect, if anything, an increase in turnover over time as managers gain more investing 
experience (see Seru, Shumway, and Stoffman, 2009). The different predictions allow us to 
distinguish rational from behavioral trading.  
 
H2: The extent of overconfident trading is an increasing function of past performance. 
 
If investors overestimate precision, they will attribute recent high performance to their 
own ability and not to general market conditions. Consequently, an overconfident trader should 
trade more aggressively after high performance than otherwise. This prediction is also 
consistent with a rational learning model (see Seru, Shumway, Stoffman, 2009) where 
managers learn about their ability and respond to high performance by trading more. Even so, a 
trader’s performance is an extremely noisy signal about his/her investing ability because stock 
returns are close to being unpredictable. Therefore, any effect of rational learning from trading 
should be quite weak. 
 
H3: Overconfident trading is more prevalent among male rather than female managers. 
 
Barber and Odean (2001) find that males suffer more from behavioral biases related to 
overconfidence than do females. Meehan and Overton (1986), Beyer (1990), and Sapienza, 
Zingales, and Maestripieri (2009) show that these biases come from innate and persistent 
differences between men and women that are determined not only by stereotypes and social 
norms which may vary over time. Since our dataset allows us to identify the name of the 
mutual fund manager, we can use this to test if the earlier results on differences in 
overconfidence by gender also hold in the mutual fund industry across various fund locations. 
If overconfident trading is present more in financial centers we expect it to be concentrated 
among male managers. Our sample of fund managers better controls for cross-gender 
 8
differences in training and investing skills than other studies that use individual investor trades 
since skill levels are presumably more homogeneous across portfolio managers. Similar skill 
and knowledge acquisition across all fund managers implies that differences in trading between 
men and women are more likely related to behavioral biases, such as overconfidence, rather 
than differences in competencies.  
 
H4: Overconfident trading does not positively predict future performance. 
 
Higher levels of turnover for overconfident traders should not result in better future 
performance since the managers are overweighting the precision of their information. In 
contrast to this prediction, in a rational trading model higher levels of trading predict better 
future performance. Therefore, hypothesis H4 helps us differentiate rational trading from 
overconfidence.   
 
The strength of all relations may be different across various subgroups of fund 
managers because demographics can affect managers’ beliefs, biases, and trading. First, since 
overconfidence decreases over time, we expect more evidence of a positive relation between 
lagged performance and current trading activity among less experienced managers in financial 
centers. Second, overconfidence may manifest itself more among fund managers who invest in 
“hard-to-value” securities, such as growth stocks, since information on growth firms is 
particularly scarce and valuable. Third, based on the work of Griffin and Tversky (1992) and 
following Schrand and Zechman (2010) and Puri and Robinson (2005), we use education 
quality as a proxy of overconfidence. This literature shows that skill provided by education is 
usually dominated by the effects of overconfidence when individuals have to make judgments 
based on ambiguous outcomes as in portfolio management. Therefore, a fund manager who 
attends a more reputable university may regard this as a proof of being more knowledgeable 
and skillful in investing matters as well, even though attending a better school does not by itself 
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imply better education and/or investing skills. Consequently, such a manager will exhibit more 
overconfident trading after good performance. Finally, prior research shows more 
overconfident behavior among men than women, so combining the third hypothesis with the 
first one we expect more overconfident trading among inexperienced male managers in 
financial centers.  
 
 
3. Data 
We use the following demographic variables from the 1990 U.S. Census. The first is the 
size of the city in terms of its total population. For population, we use the MSA (Metropolitan 
Statistical Area) or PMSA (Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area) definition of a city from the 
census data. When a city is defined as a CMSA (Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area) we 
only include those counties within 50 miles of the core city (or within about an hour commute). 
The second demographic variable is the education level per city as measured by the proportion 
of people 25 years of age or older, who hold at least a bachelor’s degree. In addition, we also 
consider the third demographic variable – the number of finance professionals working in a 
given city. This originates from a special survey provided by the U.S. Census on employment 
in 1990. This survey did not exist in the 2002 Census. We use these data and create the 
financial density variable as the ratio of the total number of finance professionals (not only 
mutual funds managers) in a given city to the city’s total population in the same year. There are 
75 distinct cities or agglomerations hosting mutual fund headquarters. The following six cities 
are defined to be financial centers: Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, Philadelphia, and 
San Francisco.4 
The data on equity mutual funds come from CRSP. We use information not only on 
fund returns and total net assets but also on fund’s year of organization, the name of its 
                                                 
4 For a definition of a financial center we follow Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2005) and Christoffersen and Sarkissian 
(2008) who point out that the above six cities have the largest number of mutual funds. 
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managers, as well as its annual turnover. Our sample covers the period from January 1992 to 
December 2002. We select all diversified U.S. domestic equity funds that have the following 
investment objectives: aggressive growth, growth & income, and large growth. To determine 
each fund’s location we use the data from Lipper Analytical which provide the headquarter 
location for fund companies in 1996. We assume these headquarters stay fixed for the duration 
of our sample 1992-2002 and hand match the headquarter information from Lipper with CRSP. 
A fund is classified to be in a given city, including a financial center if the distance of its 
headquarters from the city is no more than 50 miles.5  
Since fund management may be outsourced to unaffiliated third parties away from a 
reported headquarter location, we remove all funds that outsource their management activities.6 
We also exclude all funds recorded as “team managed,” which do not identify individual 
manager names. However, some funds are team managed but their manager names are given. In 
these cases, we associate fund management with a manager whose name appears first in the 
team list. 
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of our mutual fund data. Panel A reports the fund 
distribution across locations and investment objectives. The total number of funds is 2182 
resulting in 12,177 fund-year observations. There are more funds in financial centers than in 
other places, 1136 versus 781. Among investment objectives, large growth funds constitute the 
largest proportion of all funds followed by aggressive growth funds, 783 and 574, respectively. 
The panel also shows the number of fund management companies for each location. The 
sample contains 271 management companies out of which 141 are located in financial centers 
and 130 are located in other places. 
                                                 
5 CRSP reports fund returns for each shareclass rather than for each fund. We account for the duplication of return 
histories by asset-weighting each shareclass return and creating one return history for each fund. The value-
weighting is the size of the shareclass as a percent of the overall size of the fund with all shareclasses combined. 
Fund returns, expenses, turnover etc. are similarly asset-weighted averages so that each observation is a fund/year. 
6 Our method of determining outsourced funds uses data from the N-SAR, N-30D, and 485BPOS files available on 
Electronic Data-Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) database of the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission. From the N-SAR files, we identified all funds that report a sub-advisory arrangement. Then, we 
searched the N-30D and 485BPOS files to determine whether the sub-advisor of the fund was unaffiliated, and if 
so, we identified these funds as being outsourced. 
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Panel B of Table 1 shows fund and manager characteristics in and outside of financial 
centers along with the number of respective observations. The fund-related data are: turnover, 
size, age, expenses, volatility, as well as three fund performance measures. The fund turnover is 
defined as the maximum of total sales or total purchases as a percent of the average net asset 
size of the fund over the year. The fund size is measured in terms of its total net assets (TNA). 
The fund age is the difference in years between the current year and the year of organization of 
the fund. Expenses are defined as the annual total expense ratio of the fund in percentage 
points. Volatility is the standard deviation of monthly gross fund returns (in percent not 
adjusted for expenses) in a given year. 
The first fund performance measure is the gross abnormal return (not adjusted for 
expenses or risk). The abnormal return is the difference between the average monthly gross 
return of the fund and the mean monthly return across all funds for a given year, fund 
investment objective, and size quartile. The size quartiles are determined for all funds in each 
year and fund investment objective. The other two measures are the risk-adjusted returns (fund 
alphas) from two performance evaluation models: the unconditional four-factor model (see 
Carhart, 1997) and conditional alpha-beta model (see Christopherson, Ferson, and Glassman, 
1998). These models are: 
tititititMiiti eUMDmHMLhSMBsrr ,,, +++++= βα ,      (1) 
and 
( ) ( ) titMtTermTermitMtTbillTbillitMitTermTermitTbillTbilliiti erZBrZBrZAZAr ,,1,,1,,1,1,, ++++++= −−−− βα ,  (2) 
respectively. Here, ir  and Mr  are the returns on fund i and the U.S. market portfolio less the 
one-month U.S. T-bill rate, respectively, SMB and HML are the Fama-French book-to-market 
and size factors (see Fama and French, 1993; 1996), and UMD is the momentum factor. The 
variables 1, −tTbillZ  and 1, −tTermZ  are the demeaned instruments available to investors at time t-1, 
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the one-month U.S. Treasury bill rate and the term-structure spread, respectively. We show the 
average alphas for the entire fund history in a given location. All return measures are in percent 
per month. 
We report three manager characteristics across locations: tenure, city experience, and 
the SAT score. The manager tenure with the fund is the difference in years between the current 
year and the year when a fund manager is first assigned to a given fund. The manager city 
experience is the difference in years between the current year and the first year on record that a 
fund manager starts working in a given city. We use these two variables to proxy for the 
manager experience with the fund and the city, respectively. The last manager variable, the 
average SAT score, following Chevalier and Ellison (1999), is the average score for the 1992 
incoming undergraduate class for each manager’s university of graduation.7  
We see that the average annual turnover of funds in financial centers is significantly 
higher than those of funds in other places (89.3 versus 83.4 percent). Financial center funds are 
also significantly larger. Yet, in spite of more trading and larger size, financial center funds on 
average outperform other funds across all three measures of performance. The mean annual 
abnormal return of funds in financial centers is 60 basis points higher than that of funds in 
smaller cities. The performance differential in the unconditional four-factor and conditional 
alphas is also significant and positive for financial center funds standing at about 50 and 100 
basis points per annum, respectively. The average expenses of funds in financial centers are 
significantly lower than in other places but the medians in both location groups are almost the 
same. The average fund age, manager tenure, manager city experience, and the SAT scores are 
significantly higher among managers of funds in financial centers. 
Panel C of Table 1 reports the main statistics of the three demographic variables. All of 
them, not surprisingly, based on the means or medians are larger in financial centers. The mean 
                                                 
7 We match a manager’s undergraduate university from Morningstar with the university’s average SAT score for 
the incoming 1992 undergraduate class as reported by the College Board. Since not all managers report their 
education background and not all schools report SAT scores, the SAT scores are defined over a smaller sample, 
but this reduction does not alter the proportion of funds in financial centers versus other location. 
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financial city population is 7.3mln people, while that outside financial centers is 1.2mln people. 
The average education level in financial centers is about 4.5% higher than in smaller cities, but 
due to relatively high standard deviation, not significant. Financial density variable shows that 
there are 41 people per 10,000 of population working in finance industry in financial centers 
versus 26 in smaller cities. 
 
 
4. Fund Turnover and Demography   
We begin with the general relations between our demographic variables and mutual 
fund turnover. Figure 1 shows the relation between fund turnover and three demographic 
variables: city population (Plot A), city education level (Plot B), and financial density (Plot C). 
For each of our 75 cities, “city-level turnover” is calculated by averaging turnover for all funds 
in each city. Each plot reports the median city-level turnover for each demographic cohort.  
In Plot A, we divide cities into four population cohorts: less than 0.5 million, between 
0.5 and 2 million, between 2 and 5 million, and more than 5 million inhabitants. In Plot B, we 
divide our city sample into four education cohorts: less than 20 percent, between 20 and 30 
percent, between 30 and 40 percent, and more than 40 percent of people with a university 
degree. In Plot C, the city sample is divided into four financial density cohorts: less than 0.2 
percent, between 0.2 and 0.3 percent, between 0.3 and 0.4 percent, and more than 0.4 percent of 
people working in the financial sector. Across all three plots, we observe a sizable increase in 
the median fund turnover with the city size. For instance, the difference in turnover between the 
first and the forth cohorts across population groups is 37%, across education – 35%, and across 
financial density – 45% per year. 
Thus, Figure 1 clearly illustrates that on average fund managers trade substantially more 
in larger cities, cities with better educated population, and cities with more developed finance 
sectors. However, average or median turnover can differ across locations if there are systematic 
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differences in the number of funds with different investment objectives. Note that Table 1 
shows that financial centers have a larger number of large growth and aggressive growth funds. 
Since turnover is usually larger among growth funds, a higher turnover observed among funds 
in financial centers may simply be due to more investing in growth stocks during most of our 
sample period.8 To alleviate this problem, we prefer to deal with excess turnover rather than 
raw turnover measure in all our empirical tests. The excess turnover for each fund is defined as 
the difference between the log of fund turnover in a given year and the log of median turnover 
for all funds with the same fund investment objective in that year. 
To examine the patterns from Figure 1 in statistical terms while controlling for the 
investment objective, we regress the excess fund turnover on the set of demographic variables. 
We use the following general panel regression model: 
tiiti
titititi
i
ex
ti
iii
ex
ti
eYearDclsRiskControc
VolatilitycExpensescFundSizecFundAgec
AvgSATcExperiencec
ensityFinancialDcEducationcPopulationccTurnover
,11,10
,9,8,7,6
5,4
3210,
)( +++
+++++
+++
++++=
.  (3) 
In this model, extiTurnover ,  is the excess turnover of fund i in year t as defined above. The three 
demographic variables, population (number of people in a metropolitan area), education 
(percent of population holding a bachelor’s degree), and financial density (a proportion of 
people working in the financial sector in a metropolitan area), are transformed logarithmically. 
The variables t,iFundAge , t,iFundSize , and tiExpenses ,  are the logarithmic transformations of 
fund i age (years), size ($mln), and expense ratio (a portion of fund size) in year t, respectively. 
The fund manager-specific variable ext,iExperience  is the “excess” measure of manager city 
experience for fund i at the beginning of year t. It is computed as the difference between the log 
of manager experience in a given city in a given year and the log of the median city experience 
                                                 
8 In our sample, the average annual turnover of aggressive growth and large growth funds is 98%, while that of 
other funds is only 62%. 
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of all managers of funds with similar investment objective that year. Experience is measured at 
the beginning of each calendar year. AvgSATi is the average SAT score of a manager’s 
graduating university divided by 100. We use several variables to control for the risk of fund i 
in year t: the logarithm of fund return volatility (in percent per month), tiVolatility , , and either 
the loadings on the market, size, book-to-market, and momentum portfolios from the Carhart 
(1997) model or the loadings on the unconditional and conditional parts of the market beta from 
the conditional alpha-beta model. We estimate risk-adjusted returns using 12-month regressions 
rolling from one calendar year to another. 
Table 2 shows the estimation results where we add more controls as we move from left 
to right. Since all independent variables in (3) are the same for all funds in a given city, in all 
estimation we use the Huber-White robust standard errors and cluster standard errors by city.9 
Regressions 1 to 3 report the coefficient estimates from univariate regressions of fund turnover 
on each of the demographic variables individually. We observe a positive relation between fund 
performance and all three variables. However, only the coefficient on financial density variable 
is statistically significant. Regression (4) includes all demographic variables at once. The 
outcome is the same – the city’s financial concentration retains its positive and significant (at 
the 5% level) relation to fund turnover. This result implies that managers of funds in large and 
financially prominent cities tend to trade more. In economic terms, adjusted for the logarithmic 
transformation, an increase in financial density from 28% to 29% increases the average excess 
fund turnover by about 1.29% a year.10 
 Regression (5) of Table 2 reports the results from a version of model (1) that controls 
for common fund characteristics, age, size, expenses, and volatility. We find that in spite of the 
addition of these control variables, the slope coefficient on financial density still keeps its 
statistical significance although at the 5% level. In regression (6) we add two fund manager 
                                                 
9 Such clustering is also consistent with findings in Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2004, 2005), who show that social 
interaction leads to similar investing preferences among people from the same location. 
10 From Regression (4), 1.29% = 0.368 x [log(0.29) – log(0.28)] 
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characteristics: the overall experience of portfolio management in a specific city and the SAT 
score. The slope on the financial density variable loses some importance but still remains 
significant at the 10% level. There is a strongly negative relation between manager experience 
and turnover, implying that fund managers trade less as they gain more experience. The relation 
between the average SAT score and turnover is also negative although significant only at the 
10% level. Nevertheless, this result seems to suggest that more educated fund managers tend to 
trade less. Given that excessive trading is costly to portfolio returns, the negative loadings on c4 
and c5 suggest that more knowledgeable and experienced managers in general try to lower 
turnover. Not surprisingly, funds with higher expenses and higher return volatilities correspond 
to ones with higher turnover.  Finally, in Regression (7) and (8) we estimate the full 
specification of equation (3) with the four-factor and conditional performance evaluation model 
estimates, respectively. We see that in these regressions, the coefficient on financial density is 
significant at the 5% level. Its magnitude is also higher than in the earlier regression. Likewise, 
the slope on manager skill, the average SAT score, is negative and significant at the 5% level. 
These last two regressions show positive and highly significant relation between the four-factor 
and conditional betas again suggesting that riskier funds trade more frequently. 
 Thus, Figure 1 and Table 2 show that trading activity is significantly higher among 
funds in financially important cities. Knowing that larger cities tend to generate more 
information (e.g., Jacobs, 1969), the observed phenomenon can be simply explained by the 
existence of more informed trading in these locations. However, it could also result from 
overconfident trading that is more prevalent in financial centers. In the next section, we test the 
hypotheses of overconfident trading outlined in Section 2 by exploring the link between fund 
turnover and returns across different locations for different fund and manager characteristics. 
 
 
5. Fund Turnover and Performance 
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5.1. Turnover and Performance across Fund and Manager Characteristics 
We observe in Table 1 that funds in financial centers exhibit more active trading and 
achieve higher performance in spite of having larger size than funds located in other places. 
The next set of tests identifies the reasons for higher turnover in financial centers. 
 Table 3 shows average fund turnover and three performance measures in financial 
centers and other places for managers with different levels of experience, funds with different 
investment objectives, and different manager SAT scores. It also shows the differences in all 
measures with their respective t-statistics (in parentheses). The risk-adjusted returns (alphas) 
here are based on the four-factor or conditional alpha-beta models, respectively. They are 
estimated over 12-month regressions rolling over calendar years. The first section of the table 
depicts differences in turnover and performance between two levels of manager city 
experience, less than five years and more than five years, respectively. We see that only less 
experienced managers in financial centers trade significantly more (approximately 11% higher) 
than their peers in smaller places, yet they do not achieve any gains from this extra trading, 
irrespective of whether abnormal, four-factor, or conditional risk-adjusted returns are used. In 
comparison, there is only marginal difference in turnover for more experienced managers 
between the two locations, and all the outperformance of funds in financial centers is 
concentrated among more experienced managers as shown in Christoffersen and Sarkissian 
(2009). This finding is consistent with Gervais and Odean (2001) and Daniel, Hirshleifer, and 
Subrahmanyam (1998) since the signs of overconfident trading are present only among 
inexperienced investors, and as managers learn their true ability the turnover differential 
disappears. The decline in turnover with experience is, however, observed across all locations 
which could reflect either the additional skills gained with experience or learning. Even after 
controlling for fund size, we see later in Table 4 that more managerial experience significantly 
reduces turnover levels irrespective of location.11 
                                                 
11 This negative relation is robust to all specifications. In unreported results we observe a slight, temporary 
increase in turnover for managers in financial centers with one year of experience. This can be explained by the 
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 The second section of Table 3 shows differences in turnover and performance between 
growth- and income-oriented funds. Growth-oriented funds include aggressive growth and 
large growth funds, while income-oriented funds consist of growth and income, and income 
funds. Because of the ambiguity in outcomes associated with selecting growth stock, behavioral 
biases related to skill and/or information quality are more likely to play a more important role 
in trading these types of assets. Consistent with this, we observe higher turnover among growth 
funds in financial centers despite their larger average fund size of $1.1bln versus $0.7bln in 
other places. For income funds, where behavioral biases are less apparent, we find that larger 
fund sizes in financial centers ($2.6bln versus $0.6bln in other locations) significantly reduce 
fund turnover. 
The third section of Table 3 splits the sample by managers with SAT scores above and 
below the median SAT score of 1,165. We see that irrespective of the SAT score, fund 
managers in financial centers trade more. However, we only observe a detrimental impact of 
this excessive trading on performance among high SAT managers in financial centers. This is 
consistent with the notion that more educated people are more prone to overconfidence biases. 
Thus, Table 3 shows there are distinct differences in turnover by managerial characteristics. We 
explore these differences in the next section while controlling for other influencing factors. 
 
5.2. Relation between Lagged Performance and Turnover  
Many authors (e.g., see Odean, 1998;  Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahanyam,1998; and 
Gervais and Odean, 2001) argue that trading among investors increases following prior gains.12 
If managers of funds in larger and financially more prominent cities are more prone to an 
overconfidence bias then, for these funds, we expect past performance to positively predict 
turnover. We investigate this idea using a model in which current turnover is regressed on the 
                                                                                                                                                           
short-lived self-attribution bias, as described in Gervais and Odean (2001) and Daniel, Hirshleifer, and 
Subrahanyam (1998). These results are available on request. 
12 Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2007) document that share turnover is positively related to lagged returns for 
many months. 
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fund’s last year performance, while controlling for other fund and manager characteristics. We 
depart from the framework which relates differences in turnover across cities with different size 
and financial density, and move to a setting which directly differentiates between financial 
centers and smaller towns. The regression model is as follows: 
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where abntir 1, −  is the average monthly abnormal return (in percent) of fund i in year t-1, while 
D(City) is a dummy for city fixed effects that allow us to adjust for differences in managers’ 
trading behavior across locations.13 All other variables are defined as in equation (3). 
According to our earlier predictions of overconfidence, we expect the sign on the coefficient 
relating past performance to turnover, c1, to be positive under H2. In these and subsequent 
regressions, the turnover data from the same fund manager over time or across funds in a given 
city cannot be treated as independent. Therefore, we again use the Huber-White robust standard 
errors but cluster observations by the same manager rather than by the same city.  
Table 4 presents the estimation outcomes for funds located in and outside of financial 
centers, as well as for funds located in the New York area. We also report the test results not 
only per location but also separately for less experienced fund managers with city experience of 
five years or less and with city experience of more than five years. The coefficient of particular 
interest to us is the slope c1. We observe that among funds located outside financial centers 
(columns one to three), the relation between current turnover and lagged performance is 
negative but insignificant for any manager experience. The situation is quite different among 
funds located in financial centers (columns four to six). On average and consistent with 
overconfident trading being more concentrated in financial centers, the turnover-lagged 
                                                 
13 Due to a significant sample size reduction, we omit the manager SAT score from our set of control variables. 
For a similar reason of reduction in the sample size and because of insignificant impact on excess turnover, we 
also omit fund flows control, as do Christoffersen and Sarkissian (2009). Our overall results remain intact with 
these variables included. 
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performance relation is positive in financial centers, although insignificant when not 
conditioning on manager experience.  
Consistent with hypothesis H1, we observe a general negative relation between manager 
experience and turnover. However, this pattern may reflect both acquired trading skills as well 
as changes in beliefs about information precision. To distinguish between these two 
possibilities, we combine the predictions of H1 and H2. Therefore, we split the sample into 
those managers with less than and more than five years experience in the city and test whether 
the return-turnover relation is more positive among less experienced managers in financial 
centers. As predicted, it is only the inexperienced managers in financial centers who increase 
turnover significantly after good performance. In contrast, more experienced managers in 
financial centers do not trade more in response to lagged positive performance. 
When looking at New York funds alone (columns seven to nine of Table 4), we observe 
that the positive relation between turnover and lagged abnormal returns strengthens for the 
entire sample of managers, and that this effect comes from the sub-samples of managers with 
less than five year experience. It is important to note that the relation improves in both 
statistical and economic terms: the increase in the magnitude of coefficient on abntir ,  is almost 
2.5 times bigger, increasing from 0.018 to 0.044. In economic terms, an increase in the past 
year’s average monthly abnormal return by 1% increases next year excess turnover of funds in 
New York by almost 5%. The last row of Table 4 shows the results of the F-test, which 
compares slopes c1 between funds located in financial centers and other places. The F-test is 
based on the regression outlined in equation (4) but includes all observations and allows lagged 
returns to enter separately for financial centers and other places. Consistent with previous 
results, the slope coefficient on lagged returns is significantly higher in financial centers and 
New York for fund managers with less than five years of city experience.  
Thus, we observe that prior gains indeed may induce fund managers to increase their 
subsequent trading activity, as predicted by Odean, (1998), Gervais and Odean (2001), Daniel, 
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Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998), and others.14 We find however that this reaction to past 
performance is present largely among funds in financial centers, especially in New York. These 
findings provide the first piece of evidence of overconfident trading in financial centers. Since 
financial centers are associated with more generation and dissemination of information, it 
appears that locating in a financial center may contribute to more trading. 
 
5.3. Relation between Lagged Performance and Turnover across Investment Objectives 
From Table 3, we observe that trading in growth-oriented funds is significantly higher 
in financial centers. Therefore, we expect that overconfident trading will be more profound in 
these fund categories since growth funds hold securities with more uncertain valuations. To test 
the validity of this prediction, we augment model (4) with two dummies that split the sample of 
funds into two groups based on the fund investment objective, growth or income. Growth 
funds, GR, contain aggressive growth and large growth funds as defined by their ICDI 
objective category. Income funds, IN, are those that have a sizable income component: they 
correspond to growth & income funds and income ICDI objective categories. The new 
regression framework is: 
( ) ( )
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where ( )GRDi  and ( )INDi  are the dummies for growth- and income-oriented funds, 
respectively. All other variables are defined as before. This regression specification allows us to 
understand whether there are differences in how trading in growth versus income funds is 
                                                 
14 Similar conclusion regarding prior performance and subsequent actions is found in other empirical studies 
managerial behavior. For example, Billett and Qian (2009) examine sequential takeovers and find that CEOs are 
more likely to acquire again after positive experience from earlier acquisitions, even if their future deals are value 
destroying. 
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affected by lagged performance. We expect the coefficient c2 to be positive and significantly 
larger than the coefficient c1 for funds in financial centers. 
 Table 5 presents the estimation of model (4) across different locations. The structure of 
the table is identical to that of Table 4. As before, the first three columns of the table show the 
test outcomes for mutual funds located outside financial centers. For this fund location, the 
slope c2 is not positive for any manager experience group. In fact, the coefficient c1 on income 
funds is negative and significant. However, when we look at funds in financial centers, we 
indeed observe that the slope c2 is now positive. It is insignificantly different from c1 for the 
whole sample of funds in financial centers, but is significantly larger than c1 for the sub-sample 
of less experienced managers. Therefore, the positive relation between lagged performance and 
current turnover observed in Table 4 is present among growth funds with managers with less 
than five years of city experience. The last three columns of the table show the regression 
results for the New York area funds. Once again, we observe that the largest positive impact of 
past performance on current turnover, which occurs among New York funds, is limited to funds 
investing in growth-oriented stocks and in particular those with less experienced managers.15   
 Thus, Tables 4 and 5 show that the influence of past fund returns on current turnover 
has a distinct geographic as well as investment objective pattern. We are able to detect a 
positive and significant link only among managers of funds in financial centers, especially in 
New York, and only among funds with an investment focus on growth-oriented stocks. An 
increase in the fund turnover following prior outperformance among fund managers in financial 
centers who invest in stocks with more ambiguous and difficult valuations is consistent with 
standard patterns of overconfident behavior.  
 
5.4. Further Evidence across Managers with Different SAT Scores and Gender 
                                                 
15 The result that shows that the relation between lagged turnover and current returns differs across funds with 
different investment objectives also precludes the Dow and Gorton (1997) model based possible explanation that 
funds in financial centers trade more than other funds simply to show to their clients that they work. 
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Our previous analysis shows that the largest influence of past performance on the 
current trading activity is observed only among less experienced fund managers working in 
financial centers. In this sub-section, we investigate whether there are more signs of 
overconfident trading among those who graduate from high SAT universities and among male 
investors.  
 Table 6 shows the estimation results for managers who attended low and high SAT 
universities. There are numerous factors which can influence how individuals develop their 
beliefs about their ability and the quality of their education is one important factor. Based on 
research from Griffin and Tversky (1992), we posit that those from higher SAT universities 
will be more certain about their ability and, as a result, attribute too much of their past success 
to their own knowledge. Hence, the relation between past performance and turnover should be 
significantly more positive in this cohort of managers.  
As before, high or low SAT scores are defined as those above or below the median SAT 
score of 1,165 across all locations. Panel A reports the results for all fund managers, Panel B – 
for those with less or equal to five years of experience in their respective cities. We observe 
that the positive relation between lagged abnormal returns and current turnover is concentrated 
among better educated managers in financial centers, especially New York. This result 
becomes stronger for the subset of inexperienced managers in financial centers in Panel B. In 
contrast, the slope on lagged abnormal returns for managers of funds outside of financial 
centers who attended more prestigious universities is statistically zero. Moreover, it appears 
that inexperienced managers in smaller cities who graduated from universities with low SAT 
scores significantly decrease their trading following good performance in the previous year. 
Therefore, this table shows that better educated fund managers in financial centers show signs 
of overconfident trading.  
 Table 7 reports the estimation results from the regression of fund excess turnover on 
lagged abnormal returns for fund managers by gender. From Barber and Odean (2001) we 
know that men exhibit more overconfident trading compared to women. If location influences 
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managers’ priors about their ability, we expect this to show up particularly among less 
experienced, male fund managers in financial centers according to H1 and H3. Similar to Table 
6, Panel A shows the estimates for the entire sample of fund managers, while Panel B provides 
only the results for the sub-sample of less experienced managers and variables are defined as 
before. About 8% of the overall sample is female. Since the gender-based sample sizes are 
different, we focus on both changes in the magnitudes as well as significance levels of the 
coefficients. For example, in Table 4 the slope on lagged return for the subset of all managers 
in financial centers is 0.021 and insignificant, but after excluding about 10% of observations 
coming from female portfolio managers, this slope in Panel A of Table 7 increases to 0.028 and 
reaches almost the 5% significance level. There are similar increases among all slope 
coefficients on the lagged turnover, as well as their statistical significance relative to 
corresponding results in Table 5. As predicted by H1, we again observe a significant increase in 
the magnitude of the slope when we isolate less experienced managers: the coefficient increases 
from 0.028 in Panel A to 0.054 in Panel B. In general, there is no relation between past 
performance and turnover for female fund managers in any location. In contrast, there is a very 
strong positive relation between performance and turnover for male fund managers in financial 
centers and a significant negative relation for male fund managers in other places. Therefore, 
while the portion of female managers is small, the striking result is how different male 
managers trade in response to past returns and location. Table 7 confirms the results of previous 
studies and finds more overconfident trading among males. It also highlights the importance of 
location in terms of influencing a manager’s belief about his/her own ability as we see a very 
different relation between turnover and past performance for managers in financial centers 
versus elsewhere. 
 
 
6. Fund Performance, Manager Tenure, and Lagged Turnover 
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In this section, we test our last hypothesis, H4, that links lagged turnover to fund 
performance. We also provide robustness checks on our earlier analysis by replacing manager 
city experience with manager tenure with the same fund. The previous sections use the 
cumulative experience of a manager working in a city, so a manager will be considered 
experienced even if he/she changes funds within the same city. However, one may also 
consider that the knowledge gained in trading is job-specific, so when managers change jobs 
they need to reassess how to respond and trade on information specific to their fund. Using 
manager tenure allows us to control for job market turnover and to observe how trading 
changes while managers stay at the same fund. 
 
6.1. Fund Turnover and Manager Tenure 
Table 8 presents the relation between fund turnover and our performance measures for 
three manager tenure cohorts: less than five years, between five and ten years, and more than 
ten years. We observe that the group of least experienced managers (with less than five years of 
tenure in a given city fund) in financial centers trade significantly more but are unable to 
outperform their peers from other places irrespective of the fund performance. This result is 
similar to that using manager city experience variable reported in Table 3. Managers of funds in 
financial centers with tenures between five and ten years trade the same as those in smaller 
towns but are able to post superior performance already in terms of abnormal returns not 
adjusted for risk. The last row of the table confirms and further strengthens the results reported 
in Table 3. The most experienced fund managers in financial centers trade less than those in 
other places but are able to significantly outperform their peers from smaller towns based on 
any performance measure. This implies that better returns of more experienced fund managers 
in financial centers is driven by better investing skills and learning provided by living in a 
financial centers, as discussed in Christoffersen and Sarkissian (2009). Our findings using 
manager tenure instead of manager city experience are again consistent with Gervais and 
Odean (2001) since we still observe the signs of overconfident trading only among 
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inexperienced investors even when experience is measured by the manager’s time on the job 
rather than in the city. 
 
6.2. Impact of Lagged Turnover on Fund Performance 
The extra trading activity following prior gains among fund managers in financial 
centers that we observed in the previous section may nevertheless indicate that managers 
rationally learn from trading, where informed trading leads to superior returns in the next 
period. Ultimately it is the impact of turnover on subsequent fund returns that determines 
whether the extra trading activity in financial centers is on average beneficial. To examine this 
relation, we use a model in which abnormal fund returns are regressed on the logarithm of 
lagged excess turnover and the same set of control variables used earlier, namely: 
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where tiv ,  denotes one of the three possible returns of fund i in year t: average monthly 
abnormal returns in year t, abntir , , and risk-adjusted returns (fund alphas) for the four-factor and 
conditional models, ti,αˆ (4F) and ti ,αˆ (C), respectively. We estimate the risk-adjusted returns 
over 12 month regressions rolling over calendar years. Like city experience, Tenurei,tex is the 
“excess” measure of manager tenure with the same fund i at the beginning of year t. It is 
computed as the difference between the log of manager tenure at a fund and the log of the 
median tenure of all managers of funds with similar investment objective that year. Also, since 
contemporaneous positive fund returns correlate by definition with larger fund sizes, we use 
lagged excess fund size as a control variable in equation (6). The excess size for each fund is 
the difference between the log fund TNA in a given year and the log median TNA of all funds 
with the same fund investment objective in that year. If excess trading benefits fund 
performance, it must imply a positive coefficient c1.  
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Table 9 shows the estimation outcomes from model (6) across different locations and 
different performance measures. Panel A reports the outcomes for abnormal returns. Recall 
from our previous results in Tables 4-6 that managers in financial centers who are relatively 
inexperienced, graduate from high SAT score universities, and invest in “hard-to-value” stocks 
show more signs of overconfident trading following good prior year returns. Therefore, for 
each location, Table 9 gives the regression estimates not only across all fund managers but also 
for less experienced managers with tenures of five years of less. In addition, for the sample of 
less experienced managers, it reports the results for the sub-samples of managers who attended 
universities with above median SAT score and managers of growth funds. What we find 
consistently is that within financial centers there is no evidence that excess trading results in an 
increase in future performance. Hence, we conclude that given the short-term costs of trading, 
excess trading in financial centers is not beneficial. This does not suggest however that all 
trades of fund managers in financial centers are uninformative. They may do well at stock-
picking and hold these stocks, leading to low turnover and good performance. Christoffersen 
and Sarkissian (2009) in fact find that returns are significantly higher for more experienced 
managers in cities as a result of learning they gain from being in a financial center. The main 
point is whether extra trading is associated with better future performance which would justify 
the excess turnover we observe in financial centers. We find no evidence of this. 
We observe that funds in smaller cities exhibit a positive relation between lagged 
turnover and current year returns. Among funds outside financial centers, the slope c1 is 
significant at the 5% level for funds managed by inexperienced managers. Both the magnitude 
(almost two-fold) and statistical significance (to 1% level) of coefficient c1 increase in the sub-
samples of fund managers graduating from high SAT score universities and investing in growth 
stocks. In contrast, coefficient c1 is barely significant in some sub-samples of funds in financial 
centers. This result shows evidence that excess trading is rewarded in smaller cities but less so 
in larger ones.  
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 Panels B and C of Table 9 show the test results for the four-factor and conditional 
alphas, respectively. As in Panel A, we observe that funds outside of financial centers have 
stronger positive relation between lagged trading and current performance. When the four-
factor alpha is used as a dependent variable, the slope c1 is positive and significant at the 5% 
and 10% for the sub-samples of fund managers that attended high SAT score universities and 
investing in growth stocks, respectively. This slope is insignificant for any sub-sample of 
managers of funds in financial centers. When the conditional alpha is used as a dependent 
variable, c1 is positive and significant at the 5% or 1 % levels across all sub-samples of funds 
outside of financial centers managed by inexperienced managers. As for funds located in 
financial centers, as with abnormal returns, we find only marginal significance of coefficient c1. 
Thus, Table 9 shows that the excessive turnover of funds in financial centers does not 
increase subsequent performance in terms of either abnormal or risk-adjusted returns and has 
less predictability than for funds in other places. This holds for the sub-sample of those funds 
which are overseen by less experienced managers who attended universities with high SAT 
scores and/or invest in “hard-to-value” growth stocks. Our findings therefore support the fourth 
hypothesis, H4, that for less experienced managers in financial centers, the excess turnover 
reported previously does not improve performance.  
 
6.3. Trading, Returns, and Learning 
In this sub-section, we show that the effects of learning in financial centers documented 
in Christoffersen and Sarkissian (2009) do not result from the excessive turnover early on in a 
fund manager’s career. Table 10 reports the estimates from the panel regression of average 
monthly abnormal or risk-adjusted fund returns on lagged excess fund turnover and manager 
city experience across various locations for fund managers who stayed more than five year in 
the same city. We observe that across all locations, the relation between lagged turnover and 
fund returns is essentially zero as shown earlier. More importantly, the table shows that more 
investing experience among fund managers benefits gross and risk-adjusted returns of funds 
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located only in financial centers, especially in New York.  Indeed longer experience of fund 
managers in financial centers helps their funds post better performance over time, as argued by 
Christoffersen and Sarkissian (2009).  
The lower performance of inexperienced managers in financial centers may be related, 
at least in part, to overconfident trading. However, among more experienced fund managers, 
who show no evidence of overconfident trading, we still observe a strong positive relation 
between experience and returns (after five years). Hence, the outperformance of experienced 
managers in financial centers vis-à-vis those from other places is related to various learning 
mechanisms present in large cities, unrelated to overconfidence.  
 
 
7. Overconfidence versus Pressure to Perform 
Large cities have more competitive labor markets than smaller towns.16 This implies 
that the process of evaluation, retention, and promotion of fund managers may be more 
stringent in financial centers than elsewhere. This increased “pressure to perform” in big cities 
may create an incentive for fund managers in financial centers, especially among relatively 
inexperienced ones, to trade excessively compared to their counterparts in smaller cities. 
Therefore, one of our observed empirical predictions – that less experienced fund managers in 
financial centers trade more – could stem from the pressure to perform rather than 
overconfidence. By the same token, more experienced managers could feel more secure in their 
positions and might not face the same pressure to perform as their inexperienced counterparts 
do. 
Thus, trading might decline not because overconfidence has abated over time, but 
because with more experience comes less professional scrutiny and the freedom to make fewer, 
                                                 
16 See an article by Edward L. Glaeser, “How Competition Saved New York,” The New York Times, April 7, 2009. 
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yet more effective trades. These considerations apply regardless of location but may be more 
magnified in financial centers.  
 Table 11 tests whether job-market pressures influence our results. We examine a 
relation between the average job turnover levels among fund managers in different locations 
and the lagged ranked turnover levels. If performance pressure has anything to do with fund 
turnover, then high fund turnover in financial centers could be associated with significantly 
higher or lower job turnover in those places. For example, fund managers may increase trading 
to simply show that they work hard (see Dow and Gorton, 1997), or in an attempt to catch up 
with industry leaders in terms of portfolio composition. However, in these cases, high turnover 
is unlikely to lead to better performance, and, as a result, these managers will be forced to quit 
their funds, thus, increasing the job turnover rate. On the other hand, if higher fund turnover is 
successful in improving performance, then we expect job turnover to decrease as a result of 
more trading. The main goal of Table 11 is to determine whether there is any link, positive or 
negative, between fund trading and job turnover to ensure the results are not driven by labor 
market pressures in large cities.  
Panel A shows the test results for all managers, while Panels B and C report the results 
for less experienced and more experienced managers, respectively, where, as before, the cut-off 
experience level is being five years with the same fund. Across all panels, we observe no 
significant differences between job turnover and lagged fund turnover. Therefore, we conclude 
that fund turnover differences across locations are unlikely to be spurred by the differences in 
labor market competition. 
 
 
8. Conclusions 
While there are numerous studies on factors influencing mutual funds returns, there are 
very few which explain different levels of trading, and yet most of these focus on information-
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based reasons to trade. Our study provides the first look at the demographic determinants of 
mutual fund turnover where a managers’ education, location, experience, and gender may all 
contribute to their assessment of their own abilities and affect how they react to information 
and trade. Managers located in financial centers are surrounded by individuals who, on average, 
earn higher wages and are better educated than their peers in smaller cities. Being a part of this 
demographic location may cause managers to believe more in their own investing ability. We 
document that funds in financial centers trade more frequently than funds elsewhere even after 
controlling for various fund characteristics. 
The basis of our tests rely on the predictions of Gervais and Odean (2001) and Daniel, 
Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) models of overconfident trading where overconfidence 
is measured as an overestimate of the precision of ability or information. Our main test of 
overconfidence measures how managers react to past performance. We find a strong relation 
between lagged performance and turnover but only among managers located in financial 
centers with limited experience. We also break the sample into other subgroups and find that 
the lagged performance-turnover relation is particularly strong for less experienced males in 
financial centers and those coming from high SAT universities. To determine whether there are 
any benefits to funds in financial centers resulting from their excess trading, we examine how 
their prior turnover affects current performance and find no evidence that excess trading is 
beneficial.  
Our results suggest that portfolio managers in financial centers, especially in New York, 
feel more competent in investing than managers from smaller towns at the beginning of their 
careers. This feeling of being more knowledgeable and skillful, as argued by Heath and 
Tversky (1991), may induce them to act more aggressively on imprecise information. As a 
result, fund managers in large cities engage in more overconfident trading, but, over time, they 
realize their true ability as shown in Gervais and Odean (2001) and Daniel, Hirshleifer, and 
Subrahmanyam (1998) and reduce their turnover as we do not observe signs of overconfident 
trading beyond five years in managers’ tenure with their respective funds.  
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Table 1 
Summary statistics 
 
Panel A: Distribution of funds 
  Number of Funds  
 Obs. All AG GI IN LG Companies 
Financial centers 7093 1136 341 269 60 466 141 
Other places 5084 781 233 175 56 317 130 
Total 12177 1917 574 444 116 783 271 
 
Panel B: Fund and manager characteristics 
 Location Obs Mean S.D. Median F - O 
Fund Age F 7379 11.560 14.071 6.000 1.061*** 
 O 5267 10.499 12.882 6.000 (4.33) 
Size (bln $) F 7119 1.522 5.417 0.207 0.814*** 
 O 5122 0.708 2.236 0.141 (10.15) 
Turnover F 6509 0.893 1.143 0.667 0.059*** 
 O 4678 0.834 0.914 0.600 (2.91) 
Expenses (%/y) F 7074 1.246 0.656 1.210 -0.050*** 
 O 5082 1.296 1.002 1.119 (-3.34) 
Volatility (%/m) F 7058 0.050 0.026 0.046 0.001 
 O 5066 0.049 0.027 0.045 (0.96) 
Abnormal Return (%/m) F 7093 0.022 1.149 0.006 0.050** 
 O 5084 -0.028 1.122 -0.032 (2.41) 
Four-Factor Alpha (%/m) F 861 0.057 0.354 0.044 0.041
** 
 O 633 0.016 0.353 0.016 (2.01) 
Conditional Alpha (%/m) F 861 0.147 0.452 0.105 0.083** 
 O 633 0.064 0.414 0.034 (3.15) 
Manager Tenure F 7180 4.900 5.520 3.000 0.202** 
 O 5158 4.698 5.175 3.000 (2.05) 
Manager City Experience F 6245 6.474 5.926 5.000 0.398*** 
 O 4223 6.076 6.218 4.000 (3.30) 
SAT Score F 4383 1179 133.471 1185 49.706*** 
  O 2962 1129 141.465 1110 (15.28) 
 
Panel C: Demographic characteristics 
 Location Obs. Mean S.D. Median F - O 
Population (mln) F 6 7.355 2.951 6.535 6.146*** 
 O 69 1.209 1.052 0.949 (11.31) 
Education (% Bach 
degree) 
F 
6 
31.350 7.652 28.200 4.471 
 O 69 26.879 8.114 26.510 (1.30) 
Financial Density (%) F 6 0.410 0.124 0.393 0.147*** 
 O 69 0.263 0.076 0.255 (4.30) 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
This table gives the summary statistics of domestic equity mutual funds in the United States. The sample period is 
January 1992 to December 2002. The fund types are aggressive growth (AG), growth and income (GI), income 
(IN), and large growth (LG). Panel A shows the distribution of funds by location and investment objective. Panel 
B shows differences in fund and manager characteristics between financial centers (F) and other places (O). The 
following six cities are defined to be financial centers: Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, Philadelphia, 
and San Francisco. The fund is in a financial center if its headquarters are within 50 miles of one of the six cities 
defined as financial centers. Fund age is the difference in years between the current year and the year of 
organization of the fund. The size of the fund is its total net assets. Turnover is the annual turnover of the fund 
defined as the maximum dollar value of sales or buys in a year as a portion of the total net assets of the fund. 
Expenses are the annual total expense ratio of the fund in percent per year. Volatility is the standard deviation of 
monthly gross fund returns (in percent not adjusted for expenses) in a given year. The abnormal return is the 
difference between the average monthly gross return of the fund and the mean monthly return across all funds for a 
given year, fund investment objective, and size quartile. The size quartiles are determined for all funds in each 
year and fund investment objective. The two measures of risk-adjusted returns (fund alphas) are from two 
performance evaluation models: the four-factor model of Carhart (1997) and conditional alpha-beta model of 
Christopherson, Ferson, and Glassman (1998), respectively. For each fund, the models are estimated using all 
return data conditional on the fund having at least 36 months of observations, so the table only reports cross-
sectional averages. All three return measures are shown in percent per month. The manager tenure is the difference 
in years between the current year and the year when the manager was assigned to the fund. The manager city 
experience is the difference in years between the current year and the first year on record that a fund manager 
started working in a given city. The SAT score is the average SAT for the incoming 1992 class of a manager’ 
undergraduate university. All demographic variables are from the 1990 U.S. Census. Panel C reports the statistics 
for 75 cities in the sample. City population is the number of people in a MSA (Metropolitan Statistical Area) or 
PMSA (Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area). When a city is defined as a CMSA (Consolidated Metropolitan 
Statistical Area), only counties within 50 miles of the core city are counted. Education level is measured by the 
percent of people 25 years of age or older, who hold at least a bachelor’s degree. Financial density is the percent of 
finance professionals working in a given city, where the number of people working in finance sector comes from a 
special survey provided by the U.S. Census on employment in 1990. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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Table 2 
Fund turnover and demographics 
 
 Dependent variable: Excess Turnover 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Observations 11161 11161 11161 11161 11005 6130 4253 4253 
    
Population 0.042   -0.023 -0.020 0.016 0.010 0.008 
 (1.25)   (-0.57) (-0.45) (0.35) (0.22) (0.17) 
Education  0.193  0.025 0.054 0.185 0.057 0.107 
  (0.84)  (0.10) (0.25) (0.76) (0.23) (0.42) 
Financial Density   0.333*** 0.368*** 0.348** 0.253* 0.276** 0.263* 
   (3.03) (2.60) (2.26) (1.74) (2.03) (1.86) 
Experienceex      -0.219*** -0.241*** -0.233***
      (-7.27) (-7.99) (-7.55) 
Average SAT      -0.032* -0.043** -0.046** 
      (-1.40) (-2.03) (-2.10) 
Fund Age     -0.007 0.019 0.028 0.030 
     (-0.19) (0.60) (0.61) (0.63) 
Fund Size     -0.007 -0.003 -0.010 -0.015 
     (-0.23) (-0.11) (-0.38) (-0.55) 
Expenses     0.515*** 0.573*** 0.523*** 0.584*** 
     (11.32) (12.62) (10.37) (10.03) 
Volatility     0.496*** 0.501*** 0.059 0.196** 
     (8.24) (6.41) (0.68) (2.48) 
Beta (4F or C)       0.182** 0.510*** 
       (2.49) (7.65) 
bSMB/BTbill       0.589*** 0.028*** 
       (6.81) (3.86) 
bHML/BTerm       -0.473*** 0.001 
       (-7.02) (0.15) 
bUMD       0.524***  
       (7.71)  
Objective Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 (%) 0.52 0.58 1.38 1.43 11.36 16.67 24.16 21.23 
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Table 2 (continued) 
 
This table shows the estimates from a regression of fund excess turnover on demographic characteristics as well as 
control variables. Fund excess turnover is defined as the log of turnover less the median turnover for a fund’s 
investment category each year. Population is defined as the logarithm of the number of people in a city. Education 
is logarithm of the percent of people holding a bachelor’s degree. Financial Density is the logarithm of the portion 
of people working in the financial sector of a city. Experience is measured at the beginning of each year and 
computed as the difference between the log of manager experience (years) in a given city and the log of the 
median city experience of all managers of funds with similar investment objective that year. Average SAT is the 
average incoming SAT score for a manager’s university dividend by 100. Fund Age, Fund Size, Expenses, 
Volatility are the logarithmic transformations of fund age (years), size ($mln), expense ratio (a portion of fund 
size), and volatility (decimal). Beta is the unconditional market risk from the four-factor or the conditional alpha-
beta models. The slopes bSMB, bHML, and bUMD are the loadings on the size, book-to-market, and momentum 
portfolios from the four-factor model. We estimate the risk-adjusted return models as 12 month regressions rolling 
over calendar years. All other variables are defined as in Table 1 but are taken in logs. The intercept, fund 
objective, and year fixed effects are included in all regressions but their coefficients are not shown. The t-statistics 
shown in parentheses are based on the Huber-White robust standard errors clustered by city. The table also shows 
the adjusted R-squared for each regression. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are denoted by 
*, **, and ***, respectively. 
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Table 3 
Turnover and performance by fund investment objective and manager experience 
 
    Returns (%/m)  
 Location Turnover abntir ,  ti,αˆ (4F) ti,αˆ (C) 
City Experience      
≤ 5 years  F 1.048 0.004 0.071 0.081 
 O 0.943 -0.007 0.066 0.056 
 F – O 0.105*** 0.011 0.005 0.025 
 t-stat (3.22) (0.35) (0.26) (0.95) 
> 5 years F 0.769 0.054 0.117 0.120 
 O 0.710 -0.044 0.121 0.110 
 F – O 0.059* 0.098*** -0.004 0.010 
 t-stat (1.77) (2.83) (-0.25) (0.40) 
Investment Objective      
Growth oriented F 1.018 0.026 0.107 0.134 
 O 0.915 -0.032 0.115 0.109 
 F – O 0.103*** 0.058** -0.008 0.025 
 t-stat (3.85) (2.03) (-0.51) (1.14) 
Income oriented F 0.586 0.013 0.082 0.053 
 O 0.656 -0.021 0.040 0.012 
 F – O -0.070*** 0.034 0.042*** 0.041** 
 t-stat (-3.00) (1.47) (2.89) (2.48) 
SAT Score      
High SAT F 0.856 0.107 0.130 0.144 
 O 0.759 0.073 0.198 0.188 
 F – O 0.097*** 0.033 -0.068*** 0.044 
 t-stat (3.22) (0.75) (-2.74) (-1.38) 
Low SAT F 0.932 0.015 0.079 0.067 
 O 0.834 -0.052 0.040 0.036 
 F – O 0.098*** 0.067* 0.039* 0.031 
 t-stat (2.95) (1.82) (1.94) (1.11) 
 
This table shows fund turnover and three performance measures in financial centers (F) and other places (O) for 
funds with different investment objective and managers with different experience level and SAT scores. It also 
shows the differences in all measures between financial centers and other places with their respective t-statistics 
(in parentheses). The turnover is the annual turnover of the fund defined as the maximum dollar value of sales or 
buys in a year as a portion of the total net assets of the fund. Average monthly abnormal returns for each year, 
abn
tir , , are defined in Table 1. The risk-adjusted returns, ti,αˆ , are based on the four-factor (4F) or conditional alpha-
beta models (C). All returns are expressed as a percent per month. They are estimated over 12-month regressions 
rolling over calendar years. Manager city experience is also defined in Table 1. Growth oriented funds include 
aggressive growth and large growth funds; income oriented – growth and income, and income funds. High SAT 
and Low SAT funds are those whose managers attended universities with incoming SAT scores greater than 
(High) or less than or equal to (Low) the median SAT of 1165. The returns are averaged for each fund and year 
and are shown in percent per month. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are denoted by *, **, 
and ***, respectively. 
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Table 4 
Fund turnover and lagged returns  
 
 Dependent variable: Excess Turnover 
 Non-financial center funds Financial center funds New York funds 
City Experience  All  ≤ 5 >5 All ≤ 5 >5 All ≤ 5 >5 
Observations 3436 1894 1542 5032 2445 2587 2377 1150 1227 
     
abn
tir 1, −  -0.025** -0.038** -0.008 0.016 0.033** 0.004 0.043** 0.054*** 0.029 
 (-2.00) (-2.20) (-0.43) (1.30) (2.30) (0.21) (2.46) (2.79) (0.96) 
Experienceex -0.213*** -0.177*** -0.212** -0.205*** -0.169*** -0.213* -0.160*** -0.173*** -0.131 
 (-6.21) (-3.83) (-2.06) (-5.73) (-4.16) (-1.90) (-3.32) (-3.00) (-1.11) 
Fund Age 0.008 0.046 -0.045 0.071*** 0.130*** 0.009 0.155*** 0.237*** 0.049 
 (0.18) (1.33) (-0.57) (2.34) (4.21) (0.20) (3.65) (5.32) (0.77) 
Fund Size 0.058** 0.042* 0.066 -0.066*** -0.068*** -0.067*** -0.108*** -0.116*** -0.106***
 (2.12) (1.70) (1.45) (-3.77) (-3.85) (-2.59) (-4.11) (-4.07) (-2.75) 
Expenses 0.635*** 0.695*** 0.432*** 0.457*** 0.408*** 0.493*** 0.481*** 0.545*** 0.441***
 (4.92) (5.23) (2.68) (8.25) (5.91) (6.40) (4.85) (6.01) (3.05) 
Volatility 0.391** 0.398** 0.125 0.442*** 0.505*** 0.361*** 0.326** 0.531*** 0.180 
 (3.85) (3.17) (1.13) (5.48) (5.29) (3.13) (2.37) (3.88) (0.90) 
Objective Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test (F-O)    0.74 4.22** 0.14 1.96 5.27** 0.03 
  p-value    [0.389] [0.040] [0.710] [0.162] [0.022] [0.866] 
 
This table shows the estimates from a regression of fund excess turnover on lagged abnormal monthly fund 
returns. The abnormal return is the difference between the average monthly gross return of the fund and the mean 
monthly return across all funds for a given year, fund investment objective, and size quartile. All other variables 
are defined in Table 2. The intercept, city-specific, fund objective, and year fixed effects are included in all 
regressions but their coefficients are not shown. The t-statistics shown in parentheses are based on the Huber-
White robust standard errors clustered by fund manager. The F-test is based on the same regression including all 
observations but allows lagged abnormal monthly returns to enter separately for financial centers and other places. 
Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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Table 5 
Fund turnover and lagged returns for different fund investment objectives 
 
 Dependent variable: Excess Turnover 
 Non-financial center funds Financial center funds New York funds 
Experience All  ≤ 5 >5 All ≤ 5 >5 All ≤ 5 >5 
Observations 3436 1894 1542 5032 2445 2587 2377 1150 1227 
     
abn
tir 1, −  * D(IN) -0.121*** -0.160*** -0.050 0.016 0.037 0.009 0.007 0.026 0.018 
 (-3.43) (-3.74) (-1.10) (0.55) (0.69) (0.25) (0.24) (0.45) (0.47) 
abn
tir 1, −  * D(GR) -0.011 -0.018 -0.009 0.017 0.033** 0.003 0.050** 0.056*** 0.032 
 (-0.81) (-1.07) (-0.44) (1.19) (2.20) (0.14) (2.55) (2.77) (0.89) 
Experienceex -0.211*** -0.176*** -0.130 -0.205*** -0.167*** -0.213* -0.160*** -0.172*** -0.132 
 (-6.19) (-3.82) (-1.34) (-5.73) (-4.16) (-1.90) (-3.33) (-2.99) (-1.11) 
Fund Age 0.005 0.042 -0.083 0.071** 0.130*** 0.009 0.155*** 0.236*** 0.049 
 (0.13) (1.23) (-1.04) (2.34) (4.21) (0.19) (3.67) (5.30) (0.77) 
Fund Size 0.058** 0.041* 0.071 -0.066*** -0.068*** -0.067*** -0.108*** -0.115*** -0.106***
 (2.12) (1.71) (1.60) (-3.77) (-3.85) (-2.59) (-4.11) (-4.04) (-2.75) 
Expenses 0.629*** 0.682*** 0.461*** 0.457*** 0.408*** 0.493*** 0.482*** 0.545*** 0.441***
 (4.94) (5.18) (2.74) (8.25) (5.91) (6.40) (4.87) (6.01) (3.04) 
Volatility 0.384*** 0.378** 0.301** 0.441*** 0.505*** 0.362*** 0.322** 0.529*** 0.178 
 (3.81) (3.05) (2.41) (5.46) (5.29) (3.11) (2.35) (3.86) (0.90) 
Objective Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
This table shows the estimates from a regression of fund excess turnover on lagged abnormal fund returns for 
different fund investment objectives. The variables D(IN) and D(GR) are the dummies for income- versus growth-
oriented funds, respectively. D(IN) is defined as one if the fund is identified as either income or growth/income by 
its ICDI objective category. D(GR) is one if the fund is identified as either aggressive growth or large-cap growth 
by its ICDI objective category. The abnormal return is the difference between the average monthly gross return of 
the fund and the mean monthly return across all funds for a given year, fund investment objective, and size 
quartile. All other variables are defined in Table 2. The intercept, fund objective, city-specific, and year fixed 
effects are included in all regressions but their coefficients are not shown. The t-statistics shown in parentheses are 
based on the Huber-White robust standard errors clustered by fund manager. Statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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Table 6 
Fund turnover and lagged returns for managers with different SAT scores 
 
Panel A: All fund managers 
 Dependent variable: Excess Turnover 
 Non-financial center funds Financial center funds New York funds 
SAT score Low SAT High SAT Low SAT High SAT Low SAT High SAT 
Observations 1519 1917 1619 3413 612 1765 
   
abn
tir 1, −  -0.026 -0.014 0.007 0.019 0.001 0.049** 
 (-1.62) (-0.85) (0.39) (1.23) (-0.04) (2.47) 
Experienceex -0.186*** -0.230*** -0.120** -0.248*** -0.125 -0.155*** 
 (-4.24) (-3.94) (-2.22) (-5.40) (-1.52) (-2.76) 
Fund Age 0.051 0.001 0.024 0.078** 0.164** 0.130*** 
 (1.12) (0.01) (0.54) (2.08) (2.32) (2.74) 
Fund Size 0.039 0.056 -0.040* -0.072*** -0.058 -0.125*** 
 (1.33) (1.35) (-1.69) (-3.28) (-1.44) (-4.01) 
Expenses 0.761*** 0.535*** 0.682*** 0.354*** 0.788*** 0.358*** 
 (5.77) (2.94) (7.85) (5.69) (6.72) (3.41) 
Volatility 0.381** 0.368** 0.397*** 0.422*** 0.256 0.250** 
 (2.35) (2.90) (3.32) (3.92) (1.60) (2.11) 
Objective Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 6 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Less experienced fund managers 
 Dependent variable: Excess Turnover 
 Non-financial center funds Financial center funds New York funds 
SAT score Low SAT High SAT Low SAT High SAT Low SAT High SAT 
Observations 980 1310 1021 2234 409 1145 
   
abn
tir 1, −  -0.046** -0.006 0.020 0.036** -0.014 0.054** 
 (-2.39) (-0.33) (1.01) (2.12) (-0.39) (2.42) 
Experienceex -0.202*** -0.128*** -0.069 -0.178*** -0.001 -0.083 
 (-3.96) (-2.72) (-1.24) (-3.82) (-0.01) (-1.54) 
Fund Age 0.055 0.080* 0.073 0.128*** 0.192*** 0.193*** 
 (1.13) (1.90) (1.53) (3.43) (3.09) (3.99) 
Fund Size 0.052 0.006 -0.054*** -0.079*** -0.047 -0.136*** 
 (1.41) (0.21) (-2.20) (-3.51) (-1.44) (-4.49) 
Expenses 0.857*** 0.480*** 0.606*** 0.401*** 0.715*** 0.476*** 
 (5.72) (3.22) (6.42) (6.00) (5.74) (4.41) 
Volatility 0.503*** 0.384 0.483*** 0.425*** 0.370** 0.460*** 
 (2.80) (2.98) (3.46) (3.57) (2.22) (2.76) 
Objective Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
This table shows the estimates from a regression of fund excess turnover on lagged abnormal fund returns for 
managers who attended with different SAT scores. High SAT and Low SAT funds are those whose managers 
attended universities with incoming SAT scores greater than (High) or less than or equal to (Low) the median SAT 
of 1165. The abnormal return is the difference between the average monthly gross return of the fund and the mean 
monthly return across all funds for a given year, fund investment objective, and size quartile. All other variables 
are defined in Table 2. The intercept, fund objective, city-specific, and year fixed effects are included in all 
regressions but their coefficients are not shown. Panel B restricts the sample to those managers with less than or 
equal to five years of city experience. The t-statistics shown in parentheses are based on the Huber-White robust 
standard errors clustered by fund manager. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are denoted by *, 
**, and ***, respectively. 
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 Table 7 
Fund turnover and lagged returns for managers with different gender 
 
Panel A: All fund managers 
 Dependent variable: Excess Turnover 
 Non-financial center funds Financial center funds New York funds 
Gender Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Observations 3199 237 4550 482 2081 296 
   
abn
tir 1, −  -0.031** -0.009 0.024 -0.009 0.062*** -0.018 
 (-2.22) (-0.30) (1.61) (-0.33) (2.65) (-0.74) 
Experienceex -0.204*** -0.270** -0.219*** -0.012 -0.179*** 0.034 
 (-5.82) (-2.47) (-5.79) (-0.13) (-3.47) (0.32) 
Fund Age -0.015 0.159 0.077** 0.017 0.179*** -0.053 
 (-0.34) (1.40) (2.35) (0.23) (3.88) (-0.67) 
Fund Size 0.057** -0.009 -0.071*** -0.024 -0.126*** 0.016 
 (1.99) (-0.14) (-3.90) (-0.52) (-4.61) (0.26) 
Expenses 0.631*** -0.065 0.446*** 0.545*** 0.478*** 0.241* 
 (4.75) (-0.25) (7.61) (3.24) (4.43) (1.90) 
Volatility 0.363*** 0.519 0.433*** 0.533** 0.256* 0.904*** 
 (3.46) (1.35) (5.07) (2.11) (1.70) (3.10) 
Objective Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 7 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Less experienced fund managers 
 Dependent variable: Excess Turnover 
 Non-financial center funds Financial center funds New York funds 
Gender Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Observations 1748 146 2142 303 981 169 
   
abn
tir 1, −  -0.048** 0.001 0.045** -0.004 0.082*** -0.006 
 (-2.28) (0.01) (2.34) (-0.15) (2.70) (-0.27) 
Experienceex -0.166*** -0.230* -0.176*** -0.130 -0.188*** -0.100 
 (-3.41) (-1.67) (-3.93) (-1.62) (-2.89) (-1.20) 
Fund Age 0.038 0.094 0.140*** 0.038 0.268*** 0.001 
 (1.00) (0.87) (4.18) (0.60) (5.51) (0.01) 
Fund Size 0.048* 0.005 -0.068*** -0.048 -0.127*** -0.023 
 (1.81) (0.13) (-3.51) (-1.38) (-3.95) (-0.57) 
Expenses 0.710*** 0.386 0.403*** 0.451*** 0.577 0.274* 
 (5.09) (1.32) (5.40) (2.28) (5.67) (1.98) 
Volatility 0.394*** 0.408 0.493*** 0.605** 0.441*** 0.998*** 
 (2.98) (1.40) (4.86) (1.21) (2.92) (3.82) 
Objective Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
This table shows the estimates from a regression of fund excess turnover on lagged abnormal fund returns for 
managers with different gender. The abnormal return is the difference between the average monthly gross return of 
the fund and the mean monthly return across all funds for a given year, fund investment objective, and size 
quartile. All other variables are defined as in Table 2. The intercept, fund objective, city-specific, and year fixed 
effects are included in all regressions but their coefficients are not shown. Panel B restricts the sample to those 
managers with less than or equal to five years of city experience. The t-statistics shown in parentheses are based 
on the Huber-White robust standard errors clustered by fund manager. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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Table 8 
Fund turnover and performance for different manager tenure cohorts 
 
    Returns (%/m)  
Manager Tenure Location Turnover abntir ,  ti,αˆ (4F) ti,αˆ (C) 
   
≤ 5 years F 0.994 0.017 0.094 0.109 
 O 0.898 -0.009 0.091 0.083 
 F – O 0.096*** 0.026 0.003 0.026 
 t-stat (3.46) (0.26) (0.18) (1.23) 
> 5 and  ≤10 years F 0.739 0.038 0.114 0.117 
 O 0.709 -0.063 0.134 0.118 
 F – O 0.030 0.101** -0.020 -0.001 
 t-stat (0.94) (2.37) (-0.091) (-0.01) 
> 10 years F 0.604 0.044 0.115 0.126 
 O 0.661 -0.073 0.018 -0.004 
 F – O -0.057 0.117** 0.097*** 0.130*** 
 t-stat (-1.50) (2.13) (3.25) (3.33) 
 
This table shows the average turnover and three performance measures of funds located in financial centers (F) 
and other places (O) for three manager tenure cohorts. The turnover is the annual turnover of the fund defined as 
the maximum dollar value of sales or buys in a year as a portion of the total net assets of the fund. abntir ,  and ti,αˆ  are 
average monthly abnormal or risk adjusted returns in percent per month. The risk-adjusted returns are based on the 
four-factor (4F) or conditional alpha-beta models (C) estimated using 12-month regressions rolling over calendar 
years. It also shows the differences in all measures with their respective t-statistics (in parentheses). Statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
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Table 9 
Relation between fund performance and lagged turnover 
 
Panel A: Dependent variable: Abnormal return 
 Non-financial center funds Financial center funds 
  Shorter Manager Tenure  Shorter Manager Tenure 
 All All  High SAT Growth All All High SAT Growth 
Observations 2870 1808 1052 1223 4110 2490 1687 1813 
    
Turnoverex (-1) 0.062** 0.105*** 0.104** 0.161*** 0.008 0.048* 0.049 0.066* 
 (2.47) (2.90) (2.14) (3.02) (0.33) (1.84) (1.49) (1.68) 
Tenureex -0.009 0.018 0.051 0.021 0.024 -0.014 0.015 0.014 
 (-0.32) (0.35) (0.72) (0.27) (0.99) (-0.29) (0.25) (0.24) 
Fund Age  -0.015 -0.003 0.033 0.033 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.033 
 (-0.50) (-0.08) (0.65) (0.67) (0.10) (0.05) (-0.02) (-0.92) 
Fund Sizeex (-1) -0.043** -0.068*** -0.073** -0.098 -0.037*** -0.042*** -0.049*** -0.050** 
 (-2.44) (-3.05) (-2.18) (-3.23) (-3.25) (-2.83) (-2.71) (-2.51) 
Expenses -0.225*** -0.330** -0.331 -0.418*^ -0.098*** -0.067 -0.122** -0.081 
 (-2.57) (-2.52) (-1.56) (-2.04) (-2.91) (-1.40) (-2.46) (-1.14) 
Volatility -0.100 -0.098 0.163 -0.189 -0.062 -0.089 -0.037 -0.036 
 (-0.99) (-0.71) (0.90) (-1.20) (-0.67) (-0.69) (-0.28) (-0.28) 
Objective Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 9 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Dependent variable: Four-Factor alpha 
 Non-financial center funds Financial center funds 
  Shorter Manager Tenure  Shorter Manager Tenure 
 All All  High SAT Growth All All High SAT Growth 
Observations 2356 1406 828 943 3388 1930 1291 1404 
    
Turnoverex (-1) -0.008 0.028 0.068** 0.060* -0.024 0.017 0.009 0.030 
 (-0.38) (1.00) (2.06) (1.65) (-1.30) (0.86) (0.35) (0.95) 
Tenureex 0.016 0.040 0.095** 0.089* 0.040** 0.101*** 0.104*** 0.116*** 
 (0.79) (1.03) (2.11) (1.81) (2.30) (3.56) (2.82) (3.20) 
Fund Age  -0.116*** -0.114*** -0.061 -0.092*** -0.082*** -0.092*** -0.091*** -0.122***
 (-3.66) (-3.14) (-1.59) (-2.66) (-4.06) (-4.68) (-3.64) (-4.49) 
Fund Sizeex (-1) 0.024** 0.035** 0.032 0.019 0.003 0.010 0.007 0.017 
 (2.04) (2.09) (1.62) (1.06) (0.40) (0.97) (0.49) (1.22) 
Expenses -0.104* -0.168* -0.124 -0.077 0.008 0.039 0.057 0.048 
 (-1.81) (-1.93) (-1.00) (-0.55) (0.32) (1.32) (1.53) (0.94) 
Volatility 0.159 0.131 0.182 0.251* 0.039 0.066 0.012 0.025 
 (1.38) (0.99) (1.40) (1.82) (0.66) (0.79) (0.11) (0.26) 
Objective Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 49
Table 9 (continued) 
 
Panel C: Dependent variable: Conditional alpha 
 Non-financial center funds Financial center funds 
  Shorter Manager Tenure  Shorter Manager Tenure 
 All All  High SAT Growth All All High SAT Growth 
Observations 2356 1406 828 943 3388 1930 1291 1404 
    
Turnoverex (-1) 0.039* 0.071** 0.107** 0.122*** -0.008 0.040* 0.033 0.061* 
 (1.68) (2.24) (2.49) (2.89) (-0.41) (1.83) (1.12) (1.77) 
Tenureex 0.003 0.021 0.069 0.055 0.017 0.055 0.039 0.060 
 (0.11) (0.44) (1.13) (0.86) (0.87) (1.55) (0.86) (1.34) 
Fund Age  -0.088*** -0.088** -0.077 -0.036 -0.055*** -0.067*** -0.058** -0.115***
 (-2.96) (-2.39) (-1.58) (-0.78) (-2.73) (-2.90) (-2.01) (-3.71) 
Fund Sizeex (-1) 0.026** 0.038** 0.058** 0.008 0.005 0.009 0.001 0.016 
 (2.16) (2.22) (2.39) (0.37) (0.50) (0.65) (0.02) (0.89) 
Expenses -0.139** -0.165 -0.127 -0.158 -0.013 -0.009 0.006 -0.021 
 (-1.99) (-1.53) (-0.75) (-0.86) (-0.44) (-0.25) (0.12) (-0.34) 
Volatility 0.142 0.145 0.268 0.292* 0.040 0.107 0.023 0.121 
 (1.16) (1.01) (1.51) (1.91) (0.56) (1.05) (0.16) (1.02) 
Objective Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
This table shows the estimates from a regression of abnormal fund returns on lagged excess turnover across 
different locations. Excess tenure is computed as the difference between the log of manager tenure at a fund 
(years) and the log of the median tenure of all managers with similar investment objective each year. Shorter 
tenure denotes manager tenure of five years or less. Excess fund size is the difference between the log fund TNA 
and the log of the median TNA of all funds with the same fund investment objective in a given year. Notation (-1) 
denotes a lagged variable. All other variables are defined as in Table 2. The intercept, city-specific, and year fixed 
effects are included in all regressions but their coefficients are not shown. The t-statistics shown in parentheses are 
based on the Huber-White robust standard errors with clustering of observations from the same fund manager. 
Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 50
Table 10 
Fund performance of experienced fund managers 
  
 Non-financial center funds Financial center funds New York funds 
 abntir ,  ti,αˆ (4F) ti,αˆ (C) abntir ,  ti,αˆ (4F) ti,αˆ (C) abntir ,  ti,αˆ (4F) ti,αˆ (C) 
Observations 811 727 727 1239 1105 1105 538 486 486 
     
Turnoverex (-1) -0.041 -0.040 0.016 0.022 -0.032 -0.011 0.060 -0.015 0.004 
 (-0.79) (-1.17) (0.40) (0.62) (-1.57) (-0.39) (1.17) (-0.54) (0.10) 
Experience 0.040 -0.157** -0.148* 0.061 0.068 0.123** 0.138* 0.099** 0.156** 
 (0.34) (-2.32) (-1.71) (0.98) (1.60) (2.42) (1.78) (2.02) (2.50) 
Average SAT  0.040 0.044* 0.060* 0.045** 0.011 0.038** 0.027 0.006 0.038 
 (1.17) (1.81) (1.91) (2.08) (0.80) (2.15) (0.78) (0.24) (1.36) 
Fund Age  0.056 -0.064 -0.044 -0.005 -0.013 -0.029 0.008 0.022 -0.012 
 (0.74) (-1.40) (-0.70) (-0.13) (-0.51) (-0.99) (0.17) (0.57) (-0.26) 
Fund Sizeex (-1) -0.029 0.016 0.002 -0.050** -0.009 -0.012 -0.106*** -0.032* -0.037 
 (-0.64) (0.83) (0.08) (-2.34) (-0.77) (-0.77) (-3.90) (-1.71) (-1.57) 
Expenses -0.096 -0.120 -0.206 -0.117 -0.001 -0.017 -0.506*** -0.047 -0.046 
 (-0.44) (-1.16) (-1.63) (-1.54) (-0.03) (-0.28) (-4.69) (-0.44) (-0.32) 
Volatility -0.314 0.131 0.140 0.055 0.064 0.018 -0.467** -0.124 -0.073 
 (-1.18) (0.87) (0.92) (0.38) (1.04) (0.21) (-2.53) (-1.50) (-0.63) 
Objective Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
This table shows the estimates from the panel regression of average monthly abnormal returns in year t ( abntir , ) or 
risk-adjusted fund returns ( ti,αˆ ) on lagged excess fund turnover and manager city experience across various 
locations for fund managers with more than five years experience in the same city. The risk-adjusted returns are 
based on the four-factor (4F) or conditional alpha-beta models (C). All other variables are defined as in Tables 1 
and 2 except fund size is lagged and included as an excess variable. Excess fund size is the difference between the 
log fund TNA in a given year and the log of the median TNA of all funds with the same fund investment objective 
in that year.  The intercept, fund objective, city-specific, and year fixed effects are included in all regressions but 
their coefficients are not shown. The t-statistics shown in parentheses are based on the Huber-White robust 
standard errors with clustering of observations from the same fund manager. Statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
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Table 11 
Relation between fund turnover and job turnover 
 
Panel A: All manager tenures 
 Low Lag Turnover High Lag Turnover All Difference (L-H) 
     
Financial Centers 0.132 0.143 0.138 -0.011 
    (-1.14) 
Other Places 0.125 0.135 0.130 -0.010 
    (-0.91) 
Difference (F–O) 0.007 0.008 0.008  
 (0.74) (0.74) (0.74)  
 
Panel B: Less experienced managers 
 Low Lag Turnover High Lag Turnover All Difference (L-H) 
     
Financial Centers 0.1634 0.1561 0.1593 0.0073 
    (0.54) 
Other Places 0.1496 0.1450 0.1472 0.0046 
    (0.31) 
Difference (F–O) 0.0138 0.0111 0.01217  
 (0.91) (0.81) (1.20)  
 
Panel C: More experienced managers 
 Low Lag Turnover High Lag Turnover All Difference (L-H) 
     
Financial Centers 0.101 0.117 0.107 -0.016 
    (-1.08) 
Other Places 0.093 0.114 0.102 -0.021 
    (-1.29) 
Difference (F–O) 0.008 0.003 0.005  
 (0.60) (0.12) (0.45)  
 
This table shows the relation between job turnover and lagged portfolio turnover in financial centers and other 
places. The job turnover variable, Jobturn, takes the value one when a manager is replaced. The sample is divided 
into those funds which have turnover levels above (High) or below (low) the median fund in the ICDI objective 
category in the year prior to the observed job turnover dummy variable. Panel A shows the average job turnover 
for all fund managers, Panel B – for less experienced managers with tenures between one and five years, and Panel 
C – for more experienced managers with tenures greater than five years. The t-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
Statistical significance of the difference at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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Figure 1. Relation between fund turnover and demographic characteristics. The figure shows the median 
annual turnover for U.S. domestic equity funds located in cities with different population size, education level, and 
financial density. All data are from the 1990 U.S. Census and are defined as in Table 1. The sample consists of 75 
U.S. cities and covers a period from January 1992 to December 2002. For each of our 75 cities, city-level turnover 
is calculated by averaging turnover for all funds in each city. The graph reports the median city-level turnover for 
each of the demographic cohorts.  
 
 
